I. Introduction
Most nations apply an ex ante model of government oversight that uses sector-specific regulation to resolve both anticipated and actual conflicts in the telecommunications marketplace. Advocates for less intrusive government oversight support the immediate or gradual replacement of expert agency oversight with adjudication and enforcement remedies applied when and if conflicts and problems arise. Such ex post models rely on antitrust/competition policy principles that can be applied by some existing regulatory agencies, new competition authorities, or the judiciary. Ex post remedies may not require the adjudicator to have expertise in a specific industry, or even apply preexisting legal precedent, because the conflict resolution process typically conducts an empirical assessment whether a venture has market power and has used it to achieve anticompetitive goals.
Advocates for retaining ex ante regulation believe that an expert agency remains essential given the importance of telecommunications and the Internet to nations and their residents. They believe that despite technological innovations, the marketplace lacks sufficiently robust competition and conditions favorable for market entry. They also note that ex post remedies become available well after the onset of harm to competitors and the public. Additionally they note that in some nations, courts have reduced opportunities for consumers to seek ex post remedies by limiting rights to form a class of similarly harmed parties and by refraining from and regulatory authorities in the European Union, have considered the potential for biased broadband network access as necessitating some degree of ex ante regulatory safeguards.
5 Some authorize the NRA to operate as an adjudicator as well as a creator of rules, policies and regulations, making it possible to transition from ex ante to ex post oversight without significant change in the general structure of telecommunications regulation by government. The European behavior, is likely to produce worse public policies than nongovernmental forums. Ex ante network neutrality regulation of Internet network providers-like cable, wireline telephone and wireless companies-poses risks for the continued development of the Internet that some network neutrality advocates minimize unrealistically." Daniel L. Brenner, Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 13, 16 (Jan. 2010) . Continent, and amending Directives 2002 /20/EC, 2002 /21/EC and 2002 No 1211/2009 and (EU) No 531/2012 (April 3, 2014 ; available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+PV+20140403+ITEM-007-05+DOC+XML+V0//EN; European Commission, Digital Agenda for Europe, Open Internet; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/eu-actions; NETWORK NEUTRALITY IN EUROPE, ISBN 978-2-8027-3968-5 (Alain Strowel, ed. 2013) ; Catherine Jasseranda, Critical Views on the French Approach to "Net Neutrality," 16 J. INTERNET L., No. 9, 18 (March, 2013) Union has devised a mechanism for shifting from ex ante to ex post oversight when a specific market segment evidences sufficient competition that forecloses the ability of a single venture or group to operate biased networks that achieve anticompetitive goals. 6 In other nations, such as the United States, the NRA must apply legislatively crafted service definitions to determine the lawfulness of creating and enforcing ex ante regulations.
The paper concludes that ex post enforcement should generally serve as the goal in a deregulatory glide path that links increases in facilities-based competition with incremental reductions in government oversight. 7 However, current marketplace conditions evidence limited competition particularly for the first and last kilometer of Internet access. Because Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") serving end users still have both the incentive and ability to pursue anticompetitive strategies, the paper supports the continuing role for an expert NRA. However the paper emphasizes that ex ante regulation should concentrate on procedural safeguards rather than the creation and enforcement of substantive rules and service definitions. 
II. Strengths and Weaknesses in Ex Ante Remedies
Ex ante rules establish a regulatory regime that provides a procedure for anticipating and resolving actual disputes and problems. Typically a national legislature enacts a law providing the basic structure under which an NRA creates policies, rules and regulations. As a threshold matter, the legislature must contemplate the need for regulation and create a mechanism whereby the NRA defines services warranting government oversight and establishes rules constraining their commercial operation.
The baseline justification for regulation lies in the determination that an unfettered marketplace would fail to achieve certain goals, which in the telecommunications arena include reasonable rates, widespread availability, robust innovation, ample incentives to invest in next generation infrastructure and the inability of any single venture or group to control the price or availability of service. Put another way, ex ante regulation exists, because legislatures and NRAs conclude that consumers and competition will suffer without a proactive regulatory presence. Such vigilance appears necessary in light of the incentive and ability of venturesespecially ones with market power-to engage in anticompetitive practices.
Advocates for network neutrality regulation assume that absent regulatory safeguards market entrants and the public will suffer, because the broadband access market lacks sufficient competition that would prevent incumbents from operating in ways that hamper competition and reduce the value of an Internet access subscription. For example, network neutrality proponents worry that "retail ISPs," providing the first and last kilometer of service to end users, can exploit a monopoly to extract surcharges from upstream ISPs and content providers to secure higher quality of service. Such price discrimination delivers a "better than best efforts" service in lieu of "best efforts" that could fail to provide adequate service particularly for bandwidth intensive video content. Network neutrality advocates note that plain vanilla service has sufficed heretofore, but now ISPs appear willing and able to generate artificial congestion to nudge or force upstream ventures to pay for more reliable service. the commingling of both service types and the dissolution of any "bright line" distinction.
Notwithstanding evidence of significant convergence, the FCC has determined that it must treat these two services as mutually exclusive, despite the absence of any explicit statutory mandate to do so.
The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, defines telecommunications service as "the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2013). Telecommunications is defined as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received." Id. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). Title II of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §201 et seq., apply nondiscrimination and other common carrier requirements on telecommunications service providers. On the other hand, information service is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 153(20). These services qualify for a largely unregulated status.
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Technological convergence refers to the ability to combine previously separate services, such as voice and data, using a single medium, such as a digital network. Market convergence refers to the ability of a venture to offer a combination of services previously only available if the venture operated multiple networks. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals first held that the FCC could not sanction Comcast for using software to disable peer-to-peer file sharing by subscribers even though the company did not need to remedy congestion and had financial incentives to prevent subscribers from sharing movies it might otherwise lease from Comcast on a pay per view basis. 11 The court determined that the FCC had no direct statutory authority to impose network neutrality obligations on FCC's dichotomy). A major reviewing court does not see the need for the FCC to expect mutual exclusivity in the inventory of carrier services: "[E] even if a regulatory regime is not so distinct from common carriage as to render it inconsistent with common carrier status, that hardly means it is so fundamentally common carriage as to render it inconsistent with private carrier status. In other words, common carriage is not all or nothing-there is a gray area in which although a given regulation might be applied to common carriers, the obligations imposed are not common carriage per se. The FCC relies on a claim of ancillary jurisdiction when the Commission lacks explicit statutory authority. The FCC successfully invoked ancillary jurisdiction to regulate cable television even before the Commission received a statutory mandate to do so. "The FCC needed a hook to assert jurisdiction over cable. To reach that goal, it used a two-step process. First, the Commission found that cable was within its primary statutory grant of authority under section 152(a) of the [Communications] Act, which allows the FCC to regulate 'all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.' Second, the FCC invoked section 303(r) of the Act, which allows the Commission to issue 'such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,' as 'public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.' The FCC also referenced section 154(i), which provides that '[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with " [E] ven though the Commission has general authority to regulate in this arena, it may not impose requirements that contravene express statutory mandates. Given that the Commission has chosen to classify broadband providers in a manner that exempts them from treatment as common carriers, the Communications Act expressly prohibits the Commission from nonetheless regulating them as such. Because the Commission has failed to establish that the antidiscrimination and anti-blocking rules do not impose per se common carrier obligations, we non-common carrier rules based on the FCC's reading of Section 706 in the Communications Act 14 that authorizes the Commission to assess the availability of nationwide access to advanced services such as the Internet and to take steps to promote more access if market forces prove inadequate.
The FCC's approach requires great finesse. On one hand, it cannot impose clear common carrier duties on ISPs, unless it reclassifies them as telecommunications service providers, a tactic guaranteed to trigger substantial opposition and litigation. On the other hand, the Commission has to create ex ante rules that achieve the desired outcome of allowing ISPs to engage in commercial negotiations that will provide specialized, arguably "better than best efforts" routing options for single ventures without so balkanizing and dichotomizing the Internet into fast lanes available to ventures with deep pockets and slow lanes available to ventures, including most startups, lacking the financial resources to pay surcharges.
The FCC believes it can satisfy the prohibition on common carriage while also preventing unreasonable blockage and discrimination by using the applying precedent that the FCC only required wireless carriers to negotiate commercially reasonable terms meaning that terms and conditions need not be uniform and roaming need not be even offered if technically infeasible.
A. Overbreath and Underinclusiveness in Ex Ante Network Neutrality Rules
Ex ante rules imposing network neutrality requirements have the potential to overshoot the mark by exceeding an NRA's statutorily conferred jurisdiction, but also fail to cover some harmful anticompetitive practices. In the United States the emphasis on statutorily-configured service definitions forced the FCC to make a threshold determination into which category an
Internet-mediated service fits. For telecommunications services, the FCC can apply ex ante regulation, but for information services ex ante regulation is questionable at best. In the European Union ex ante regulation applies, but a transition to ex post adjudication remedies occurs when market conditions become so competitive that no single enterprise or group displays significant market power. (Fall, 2007) . the FCC currently struggles to find ways to shoehorn lawful ex ante regulation that are effective, but do not impose impermissible common carrier, telecommunications service regulations.
Ex ante regulation also risks triggering false positives, i.e., a violation that causes no harm as well as false negatives, i.e., harmful conduct not detected as a rule violation. Using consumer welfare as the primary measure of utility, ex ante regulation should accrue more consumer benefits offset by lower harms than that available from ex post, or other safeguards.
One cannot easily undertake a cost/benefit analysis, because both variables are hard to identify and almost always difficult to quantify.
Even with a conscientious and well trained staff an NRA may lack the technical competency that qualifies it to make "expert" judgments. Ex ante regulations require an NRA to anticipate future problems and to identify potential causes for conflicts and harms to consumers.
Typically an NRA becomes aware of a problem only after it has become acute and consumers complain that "mission critical," bistreams of "must see" video have become degraded. The NRA must undertake a forensic investigation to identify the technical reasons for service degradation as who, or what caused the problem. Predictably stakeholders will dispute cause and effect thereby forcing the NRA to assume twin roles as fact finder and adjudicator.
NRAs have achieved mixed success in crafting regulations that anticipate problems and provide appropriate remedies. Even if they succeed in achieving a fair, "rough justice" process, NRAs have no certainty that they can "future proof" the rules so that they remain viable and effective in light of technological change as well as the convergence and robust change in markets. NRAs will attempt to fashion flexible rules than can respond to changed circumstances, but they may not be able to keep up with technological and marketplace change, or they may generate too much ambiguity in rules ostensibly to promote necessary flexibility.
Alternatively NRAs may strive for certainty at the risk of creating inflexible rules and static definitions. Specificity helps an NRA draw a bright line distinction between regulated and unregulated services, but such a dichotomy may not survive technological innovations and market convergence that create incentives for ventures to offer an inventory of both regulated and unregulated services, e.g., in the U.S. regulated telecommunications services and largely unregulated information services.
Additionally NRAs may experience difficulty in establishing the cause and responsible party for a harmful outcome. Internet-mediated services present a particularly vexing problem for NRA forensic investigations in light of the fact that numerous network operators typically participate in the switching and routing of content from source to end user. When retail broadband service subscribers experience frozen, blurred or disrupted service, they cannot readily determine the cause of the problem and the responsible party.
For example in early 2014 many Netflix customers experienced degraded service when attempting to download and immediately view "streaming" video content. 16 Netflix asserted that ISPs such as Comcast and Verizon deliberately caused congestion, by refusing to make timely network capacity upgrades, or by rationing available transmission and switching capacity in ways that increased the probability of congestion for the traffic of specific content types and 
B. Inefficiency and Defective Outcomes
Before an NRA establishes final and binding rules, it typically initiates a process to compile a complete evidentiary record by inviting any interested parties to participate. This process, often termed a rulemaking or public consultation, takes significant time and effort.
Given the stakes the most comprehensive filings come from ventures likely to be adversely affected by new rules. These stakeholder often incur sizeable expenses in retaining the services of lawyers, economists and other experts to assist in the preparation of document that will become part of the NRA's record. Often the work product of these experts masquerade as scientific fact finding, research and analysis, despite being nothing more than sponsored advocacy.
18 17 "The hit political drama series of Netflix kept about 60,000 subscribers glued onto their screens on Valentine's Day to watch the whole 13-hour production. However, the shifting behavior of consumers to watch videos on demand over the Internet is causing some clogged pipes on the information highway." Randell Suba, Netflix-Verizon standoff: Only net neutrality can now stop video slowdown, TECH TIMES (Feb. 23, 2014) ; available at: http://www.techtimes.com/articles/3670/20140223/netflix-verizon-standoff-only-net-neutralitycan-now-stop-video-slowdown.htm. Stakeholders have great incentives to delay the onset of new burdens and have many ways to achieve such an outcome including litigation, lobbying the legislature and using procedural tactics. Additionally parties anticipating a bad outcome will attempt to reframe the issues in a proceeding as less about creating rules and more about misguided efforts that will harm consumers by creating regulatory uncertainty and disincentives for ventures to risk making necessary investments in new infrastructure. Stakeholders opposed to ex ante regulation will attempt to persuade the legislature to preempt or constrain NRA initiatives on grounds that rules impose unnecessary costs to both service providers and consumers. 19 The process can easily get sidetracked into a dispute about the robustness and competitiveness of the marketplace and the virtue in maintaining the least amount of government intrusion in the lives of consumers and corporations.
C. The Inability to Combine Ex Ante and Ex Post Functions in Some Countries
Some national governments foreclose the option for an NRA to use both ex ante and ex post regulation as appropriate. 
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"The European approach to telecommunications regulation provides a framework for encouraging diversity through market entry. If a national regulator finds that a firm possesses Significant Market Power ('SMP') within a defined market, it may impose obligations including transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access to and use of specific network facilities, and price controls. If there is no SMP, such obligations must be rolled back. The current review of the E.U. Framework Directive indicates that European regulators continue to be mindful of diversity as an important component of a healthy communications system. It proposes that regulators will focus their resources on the market sectors in which the dominance of incumbents has been least challenged. 
III. Strengths and Weaknesses in Ex Post Remedies
Ex post remedies apply when an aggrieved party can supply evidence supporting claims that a particular venture caused specific harm in violation of one or more laws enacted to promote full and fair competition. The ex post remedy applies to real and proven harms. While the specificity of harms prevents awarding damages and prescribing remedies for false positives, the potential for false negatives are significant. Ex post adjudication works best when an aggrieved party can identify the cause of harm and quantify it. For violations of network neutrality, aggrieved parties may not have an easy time identifying the cause of traffic congestion harm that has resulted in service outages or degraded network performance. Even if it can identify the culprit an aggrieved party may not easily quantify the harm in terms of lost subscriptions, revenues and profits. For example even if a party proved that an ISP deliberately degraded service, it might have difficulty quantifying how many existing customers terminated service and how many prospective customers opted not to take service. Existing customers may opt out of service, a process commonly referred to as churn, for a number of reasons. A venture seeking damages from an ISP could not readily prove that ISP deliberate meddling with bitstreams constituted the primary and proximate cause for the nonrenewal.
The cost of ex post remedies and the likely time it takes to secure relief can have a potentially debilitating impact even for ventures that can prove causation and damages. For startup ventures the risk from biased networks lies in both higher costs for a delivery of service to end users, but also strategies that tilt the competitive playing field in favor of a surcharge payer, or affiliate of the ISP providing the last kilometer content delivery. New ventures without deep pockets to pay "better than best efforts" surcharges may fail to achieve a fair market trial based simply on having been targeted for a higher payment. Proving such targeting may would require a comprehensive and possibly expensive reverse forensic investigation of why a market entrant, generating a low volume of traffic, initially could have it delivered to customers without a surcharge payment, but now its customers experience inferior and unacceptable service that can be remedied only with payment of a surcharge.
A. Limited or Eliminated Ex Post Remedies
In some nations the judiciary has expressed growing reluctance to provide a forum for conflict resolution if the expert regulatory agency, with the power to impose ex ante rules, has opted for deregulation. 21 Under this scenario an ex post remedy does not exist on grounds that than the ex ante regulator abandoned oversight, or never had the jurisdiction to do so in the first place.
In the United States the Supreme Court has issued decisions that substantially curbs the availability of an ex post antitrust remedy if the FCC had jurisdiction over a disputed service and declined to regulate it. 22 The Court concluded that because industry sector-specific legislation provides the FCC with authority to craft ex ante regulatory remedies, when the FCC refuses to act, presumably based on the existence of sufficient and sustainable competition, appellate courts have no legal basis for imposing additional antitrust safeguards. The Supreme Court also affirmed the FCC's decision to classify all types of broadband Internet access as information services thereby eliminating the prospect for ex ante regulation. the FCC has determined that one carrier has no duty to deal with an actual or prospective competitor, a court applying antitrust law should not impose such a duty either.
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The Supreme Court's deference to the FCC has gone so far as to allow an incumbent carrier to offer end users lower retail rates than the wholesale rate it might voluntarily charge competitors, an apparent predatory and anticompetitive practice commonly referred to as a price squeeze. 24 In 2003 for the majority, Justice Scalia asserted that expert witness studies relied upon by the plaintiff class could not measure damages that applied uniformly to all members as is required for certification of class on issues pertaining to law or fact.
28 This means that individuals will have to file separate law suits to recover damages for the anticompetitive harm allegedly resulting from Comcast's acquisition of the Adelphia Communications cable system in the Philadelphia metropolitan market thereby increasing concentration of ownership in the region.
The Court rejected the lower court's acceptance that an expert witness's regression analysis could quantify the total financial harm, in the amount of $875,576,662, resulting when Comcast's "clustering" strategy deterred market entrants from offering a competitive alternative to Comcast in the Philadelphia video market:
By refusing to entertain arguments against respondents' damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification, simply because those arguments would also be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of our precedents requiring precisely that inquiry. And it is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating certification, respondents' model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.
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Justice Scalia characterized the case as simply one that turned on the straightforward application of class-certification principles. He noted that the damages estimate factored in four 28 Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) a class action law suit can proceed only if the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. To meet the predominance requirement respondents had to show "(1) that the existence of individual injury resulting from the alleged antitrust violation (referred to as 'antitrust impact') was 'capable of proof at trial through evidence that [was] common to the class rather than individual to its members'; and (2) that the damages resulting from that injury were measurable 'on a class-wide basis' through use of a 'common methodology.'" Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1430 (citations omitted). The dissenting opinion chides the majority for reformulating a more difficult burden that a plaintiff must satisfy to allow a class action law suit to proceed to trial. Instead of having to prove a preponderance of common damages among all parties in the class action law suit, the dissent interprets the majority as changing the facts of the case, ignoring settled law on antitrust and now requiring extreme accuracy in the calculation of financial harm that cannot deviate even when the geographical size of the market includes urban, suburban and even less concentrated outlying areas.
Courts also allow carriers to insert binding arbitration clauses in service contracts thereby eliminating the option for consumers to seek a court-ordered remedy even if the conduct of an ex ante regulated carrier approaches unconcionability. 31 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
30
Id. 131 S.Ct. at 1435. 
B. Near Term Factors Supporting Retained Ex Ante Regulation
Using an assessment whether significant market power exists in the broadband access marketplace, one cannot yet conclude that a robustly competitive marketplace exists in the United States in all market sectors. The FCC recently recanted a previous determination that all Americans, regardless of location and income, had ample access to broadband services 32 even though most consumers benefit by having access to two broadband delivery media provided by incumbent cable television and telephone companies. In 2014 Google Fiber served three metropolitan areas: Kansas City, Provo and Austin. Google Fiber, Cities and Plans; available at: https://fiber.google.com/cities/. The venture has plans to serve nine additional metropolitan areas. https://fiber.google.com/newcities/. slower bit transmission speeds, have lower caps on monthly use, charge higher rates and require payments for necessary receiving equipment. Additionally, higher latency, caused by the distance to and from satellites, can disrupt some uses. 34 The newest generation of terrestrial wireless service provides a broadband option, albeit one with much significant data caps making the per megabyte cost of service significantly higher than wireline options. See, e.g., Verizon Wireless, The More Everything Plan, available at: http://www.verizonwireless.com/wcms/consumer/shop/shop-data-plans/more-everything.html.
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"The Commission also convincingly detailed how broadband providers' position in the market gives them the economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the services they furnish edge providers. Because all end users generally access the Internet through a single broadband provider, that provider functions as a " 'terminating monopolist,' " [citing Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905, 17919 (2010) ] with power to act as a "gatekeeper" with respect to edge providers that might seek to reach its end-user subscribers, [citing Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 See Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905, 17924-25 (2010) [hereinafter cited as 2010 Open Internet Order] aff 'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014 ).
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For a summary of major peering disputes see Jon Brodkin, Why YouTube buffers: The secret deals that make-and break-online video, ARS TECHNICA, (Jul. 28, 2013) ; available at: http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/07/why-youtube-buffers-the-secretdeals-that-make-and-break-online-video/.
Technological convergence refers to the ability to combine previously separate services, such as voice and data, using a single medium, such as a digital network. Market convergence refers to the ability of a venture to offer a combination of services previously only available if the venture operated multiple networks. Convergence makes it difficult for NRAs to define specific services and to apply different regulatory regimes. For example, the United States uses ex ante regulation based on interpretation of statutory authority by the FCC using static definitions such as telecommunications service and information service. The FCC has created a regulatory dichotomy with information services largely exempt from regulation even as providers of these services compete with incumbents treated as regulated common carrier, telecommunications service providers.
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Convergence makes it difficult even for nations to use ex post remedies. As markets combine, an adjudicator (competition authority, or court) might have difficulty defining the relevant market for purposes of determining whether one or more ventures have significant market power.
2)
Regulatory Asymmetry 'Y., No. 4-5, 400-412 (May, 2013) . company, facing projections of even greater customer churn and declining revenues, acquires ventures that can combine broadband access and "over the top" ("OTT") services 44 leading to significant market power.
5) Changes in Consumer Expectations
Consumers increasingly have no tolerance for attempts by ventures to ration access to content based on willingness to pay. Incumbents prefer to use "windows" to exact maximum revenues from content by using a linear sequence of access over time, e.g., theatrical display of a movie, followed by DVD sale, on demand access, rental, premium channel display and broadcast. Consumers have little patience for "appointment television" that uses possibly exclusive, time-based windows in lieu of platforms for access at anytime, anywhere, via any device and in any delivery and presentation format. Consumers also evidence technology agnosticism in the sense that they appear to have little concern about the medium used to deliver content and to some extent the size and resolution of the presentation screen and degree of signal compression used.
The proliferation of new Internet-centric services possibly increases concerns about whether the Internet can remain sufficiently open and neutral absent government oversight. More services will traverse fewer networks making it likely that higher reliance helps surviving network operators acquire and sustain market power. Nations may determine that broadband network operators, providing last kilometer content delivery, possess significant market power.
Consumers typically have limited broadband delivery options and usually rely on one venture to 44 "Over-the-top VoIP [and other] services require the end user to obtain broadband transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-top . . . [services] can vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their own facilities." Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905, n. 48 (2010) . serve all their traffic carriage requirements. NRAs may have to link market power assessments with the need for ex ante network neutrality rules and regulations.
In any event, the rise in OTT options raises the stakes in the network neutrality debate.
Ventures providing video content, e.g., Netflix and other IPTV providers, may assert that ex ante regulation remains essential even without a determination of significant market power based on the potential for anticompetitive harm.
7) Viability of Resale and Virtual Network Competition
Most OTT service providers lease broadband capacity for service delivery. Without safeguards for resellers and virtual network operators, the potential exists for owners of the transmission facilities to engage in anticompetitive practices, e.g., price squeezes, predatory pricing and refusals to deal. For nations, including the United States, that have determined broadband service providers should not bear trigger conventional common carrier obligations, a refusal to deal may be lawful even as it could hamper, or preclude non-facilities based network competition.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The elimination of ex ante, telecommunications regulation should serve as goal tempered by the reality that current marketplace conditions may not generate sufficiently robust competition that can ensure effective self-regulation. Nations should make the migration from well calibrated ex ante regulation should persist. 46 However the nature of ex ante regulation should change on an incremental basis as marketplace conditions make self-regulation more plausible.
Government regulation should not operate from an absolute dichotomy with sectorspecific regulation inferred as intrusive, but necessary and ex post adjudication considered an unobtainable option. In light of many changed circumstance ex ante regulation may remain necessary, but the scope and burdens imposed should shift. Currently there exist many factors that work against the onset and sustainability of facilities-based broadband competition.
Likewise many additional factors can come into play that can affect the level of competition, but in not easily predicted ways. These circumstances may change in the future so that an incremental shift toward ex post remedies might begin.
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See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175 (Spring, 2014)(identifying a diverse regulatory toolkit available for limited and well calibrated government oversight).
